Fidel Castro In Cuban Missile Crisis History Essay

Fidel Castro In Cuban Missile Crisis History Essay Scope: The investigation will focus in assessing the importance and significance of Fidel Castros role in the Missile Crisis of 1962. Method: Castros degree of significance will be evaluated through his roles in chronological stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis, along with the reference to the superpowers. The chronological stages of roles of Castro will be divided by the background stage with the alliance between USSR, the climax stage with the shoot down of American U-2 plane and nuclear attack suggestion, and by the ending stage with the resolution in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Summary of Evidence Background Stage Invasions of US and Cubas alliance with USSR -The break up between Castro and US was already expected by the US invasion Bay of Pigs of Cuba in 1961, where US supported Cuban counter-reactionaries to overthrow Castro. -As the invasion failed, it caused Castro to form alliance with USSR, fearing further invasions of US to overthrow him. -Castros fear came to real when Cuban intelligence spotted the US activities that eventually led to Operation Mongoose in early 1962, which was another invasion designed by US to overthrow Castro. -However, as a new alliance of Cuba and Castro, USSR promised and proposed for the plan for the protection of Cuban regime, which was to ship install nuclear warheads to Cuban territory, before US would find out about it. -Castro welcomed Khrushchevs plan, and the USSR shipped their nuclear warheads to Cuba in stealthy manner, avoiding eyes of US. Initial Stage Nuclear Missiles in Cuba -It was in October 1962 that US intelligence finally found out about Soviet nuclear warheads, which were already shipped to Cuba and were in the preparation for use. -The Cuban Missile Crisis begins on 22. Oct. 1962 as US President Kennedy officially announces that numerous number of USSR nuclear warheads sites, suggesting the possibility of nuclear attack against US. -With the broadcast in the public, Kennedy quickly responded by implementing naval blockade of Cuba, and tried diplomatic negotiations with USSR to reduce the tension of the superpowers with the removal of the nuclear warheads in Cuba. -However, even in the negotiations, numerous tension-heightening incidents occurred to blur the improving relationship between the superpowers, and the danger of nuclear war emerges. Climax Stage U-2 Airplane/Castros Demand of Nuclear Strike -In the midst of negotiations between USSR and US, one of the incidents occurred, which was the shoot down of U-2 US Airplane on 27. Oct. 1962. -At the time, US and USSR believed the incident was the action of Castro, ordering anti-aircraft artillery to shoot down U-2 airplane on the day. -However, it was discovered that it was the action of USSR solider that shot down the U-2 airplane, not Castro. Soviet soldiers shot down the U-2 airplane without the order from Castro. -In addition to U-2 Airplane, another incident during the negotiations was that Castro sent letter to Khrushchev, suggesting a first nuclear strike on US. -Castros action stunned Khrushchev, and from that time, Khrushchev sorted him as young and emotionally charged man who was too inexperienced. Ending Stage Resolution of Crisis and Negotiations -Despite tension-heightening actions during the negotiations, the Cuban Missile Crisis was heading towards the end. -Mutual solution was achieved by the proposal message of Khrushchev on 26. Oct. 1962, and by the acceptance response of Kennedy in 27. Oct. 1962. -The solution was concluded that USSR would depart nuclear warheads out of Cuba under UN supervision, and in return, US would dismiss naval blockade of island and promise never to invade Cuba again. -On 28. Oct. 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis came to an end as Moscow broadcasted that Khrushchev has decided to de-install nuclear bases in Cuba and return them to USSR. -However, throughout the whole period of negotiation of the Crisis, the table of negotiation involved only two superpowers, leaving out Castro. -The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a shock and humiliation to Castro, as he was not given rights to speak for he has been excluded from the negotiations. Evaluation of Sources Analysis Firstly, in the background stage of Cuban Missile Crisis, the role of Castro seems to be influential with the reasons being that he has made successful alliance with USSR and consented to its plan, thereby bringing in nuclear warheads for the sole purpose of protecting Castros government against US. Nevertheless, the significance of Castros role may be limited since it is difficult to see Khrushchevs purpose of alliance with the supply of nuclear warheads as a plan to simply protect Castro and Cuba from US. Within a big picture, it is more likely that USSR is trying to maintain the balance of power of the superpowers, because USSR was in imbalance of strategy with US before the Cuban Missile Crisis, for US was surrounding USSR military bases in the region of Turkey. Therefore, USSRs sending nuclear missiles is to let US learn what it is like to have their land and people put in danger. Moreover, the superpowers secret negotiation in Oct 1962 in which USSR would take back nuclear when US promises to remove blockade of USSR military bases in Turkey makes it more clear that the USSR alliance and supply of nuclear warheads to Cuba are more reasonable when they reflected by USSRs sole interests rather than of Castros. Secondly, in the climax stage of Cuban Missile Crisis, which was during late October 1962, US U-2 airplane was shot down in Cuba. Castro was suspected as in taking his role in crashing US U-2 airplane, as Khrushchev notes that Fidel Castro gave orders to USSR soldiers to put down US U-2 airplane. The role that Castro played in the Cuban Missile Crisis would have been significantly large as it would end the diplomatic negotiations around the Crisis and start a total confrontation of nuclear weapons between the superpowers. However, after further investigation, as it is proven that Soviet soldiers crashed U-2 airplane with no orders from Castro, his role in the Crisis cannot be given any significance as he has not taken any action. Furthermore, role of Castro is related with his suggestion to USSR to launch first nuclear strike attack on US. However, not only was his role proven to be insignificant as Khrushchev rejected to accommodate his suggestion of plan, but Castros over-eagerness in advocating nuclear war ironically reminded Khrushchev of the significance of preserving the peace of the world, thereby contributing to the peaceful outcome by the crisis resolution in 26,27th Oct 1962. Lastly, in the ending stage with the resolution of the crisis and negotiations, Castros exclusion from the USSR-US negotiations of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the crucial indication that shows political insignificance of Castro in the role of the Crisis. Because Castro was not invited, there is no influence from his voice that would have shaped the outcome of the negotiations in the Crisis. Castro was informed of Khrushchevs announcement of removal of all nuclear warheads and the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the radio after the day of the negotiations, just like everyone else in the world. This suggests that to the behalf of USSR and US, in the concern of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro was significant no more than just an ordinary Cuban citizen. Many US politicians at the time of the Crisis agree upon the fact that Cuba was just a background setting for the US-USSR confrontation. Indeed, Castro could not take any significant role in the Crisis because the conflict was solely between the United States and the Soviet Union.  [1]   On the other hand, however, Khrushchev mentioned in the memoir that Cuban Castro actually played important role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev states that Castro was fully responsible for the crash of U-2 airplane, and his support of nuclear war has encouraged and made USSR to consider about launching an unexpected attack on US. However, as it has been found out that the crash of U-2 plane did not involve Castro in any aspect, and that Khrushchev has made such statements without specific and clear details in his memoir, it is hard to accept that Castro was significant in his role of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Conclusion Throughout the whole stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the background to the ending, the role of Castro has been overshadowed by the roles of USSR and US. In the background stage, it was Khrushchev who planned and carried out the shipment of nuclear warheads into Cuba to trigger the crisis. Also, in the climax stage, Castros possible significant role in U-2 airplane shoot down was proven to be wrong as Castro has found to be unrelated with the incident. As Bonsal argues, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a conflict that only involved USSR and US. The view is justified as we look into possibilities that Khrushchev has deployed his nuclear warheads for different motives other than to protect Castro from US and when we consider Castros exclusion from the negotiation table. In conclusion, the extent of Fidel Castros significance in his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis is absolutely limited. Castro, Fidel, and Ignacio Ramonet. Fidel Castro: My Life: A Spoken Autobiography. New York: Scribner, 2008. Print. Coltman, Leycester. The Real Fidel Castro. 1st ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Print. Connolly, Sean. Castro: A Beginners Guide. London: Hodder Headline, 2002. Print. Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Knopf, 2008. Print. Griffiths, John. The Cuban Missile Crisis. Vero Beach, Florida: Rourke Pub Group, 1987. Print. Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace. New York: Anchor, 1996. Print. Kennedy, Robert F.. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crises. New York: Signet, 1983. Print. Skierka, Volker. Fidel Castro: A Biography. University Park, PA: Polity, 2004. Print. Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton Company, 2003. Print. Winters, Paul A.. Historys Great Defeats The Cold War (Historys Great Defeats). 1 ed. Farmington Hills, MI: Lucent Books, 2000. Print.

Free Death Penalty Essays: Religious Perspectives of Capital Punishment :: Argumentative Persuasive Topics

Religious Perspectives on Capital Punishment    Travelling around the world, this paper presents the various religious perspectives evidenced in recent actions taken regarding the death penalty.    In St. Lucia, regional Roman Catholic Bishops, at the Antilles Episcopal Conference held as part of the Antilles Eucharist Congress held in St Lucia in May, publicly stated their wish to see the abolition of the death penalty. The president of the conference, Edgerton Clarke, Archbishop of Kingston, Jamaica, said that while he and his colleagues were mindful of the support for capital punishment in the region they saw life as being of tremendous value, and hoped for the abolition of the death penalty. Capital punishment was one of several issues discussed at the Episcopal Conference which is a forum through which Caribbean bishops examine what is happening in the church and society. The Congress was attended by some 20,000 Catholics from the regional and international community.    In Italy, at a papal mass celebrated by Pope John Paul II at Rome's Regina Coeli Prison on 9 July, prayers were offered for prisoners on death row who were awaiting the end of their existence, and for those kept in inhuman conditions. ''May the death penalty, an unworthy punishment still used in some countries, be abolished throughout the world'' the Pope said.    During the year 2000, the Jubilee Year of the Roman Catholic Church, the Coliseum in Rome has been lit up with a bright white light every time a country abolished the death penalty or announced a moratorium on executions. It was also illuminated if a death sentence was commuted or a prisoner sentenced to death was found to be innocent and released.    In the Russian Federation, meeting in Moscow, the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church on 16 August called for an end to the death penalty. The church gave as its reasons for opposing the death penalty the fact that it can make a judicial error irreparable and also because the penalty causes controversy in society.    In the USA, in February the pastor of the White House, the Reverend Philip Wogaman, senior minister at Washington's Foundry Methodist Church, called for a review of the death penalty, adding his voice to those concerned that innocent people have been condemned and that sentencing is prone to racial bias.    ``Maybe there are circumstances in which historically one can justify this.

Ethical neutrality Essay

In what follows, when we use the term â€Å"evaluation† we will mean, where nothing else is implied or expressly stated, practical value-judgments as to the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence. The problem involved in the â€Å"freedom† of a given discipline from evaluations of this kind, i. e., the validity and the meaning of this logical principle, is by no means identical with the question which is to be discussed shortly, namely, whether in teaching one should or should not declare one’s acceptance of practical evaluations, regardless of whether they are based on ethical principles, cultural ideals or a philosophical outlook. This question cannot be settled scientifically. It is itself entirely a question of practical evaluation, and cannot therefore be definitively resolved. With reference to this issue, a wide variety of views are held, of which we shall only mention the two extremes. At one pole we find (a) the standpoint that there is validity in the distinction between purely logically deducible and purely empirical statements of fact on the one hand, and practical, ethical or philosophical evaluations on the other, but that, nevertheless – or, perhaps, even on that account- both classes of problems properly belong in the university. At the other pole we encounter (b) the proposition that even when the distinction cannot be made in a logically complete manner, it is nevertheless desirable that the assertion of practical evaluations should be avoided as much as possible in teaching. This second point of view seems to me to be untenable. Particularly untenable is the distinction which is rather often made in our field between evaluations linked with the positions of â€Å"political parties† and other sorts of evaluations. This distinction cannot be reasonably made: it obscures the practical implications of the evaluations which are suggested to the audience. Once the assertion of evaluations in university lectures is admitted, the contention that the university teacher should be entirely devoid of â€Å"passion† and that he should avoid all subjects which threaten to bring emotion into controversies is a narrow-minded, bureaucratic opinion which every teacher of independent spirit must reject. Of those scholars who believed that they should not renounce the assertion of practical evaluations in empirical discussions, the most passionate of them – such as Treitschke and, in his own way, Mommsen- were the most tolerable. As a result of their intensely emotional tone, their audiences were enabled to discount the influence of their evaluations in whatever distortion of the facts occurred. Thus, the audiences did for themselves what the lecturers could not do because of their temperaments. The effect on the minds of the students was to produce the same depth of moral feeling which, in my opinion, the proponents of the assertion of practical evaluations in teaching want to assure – but without the audience being confused as to the logical distinctiveness of the different types of propositions. This confusion must of necessity occur whenever both the exposition of empirical facts and the exhortation to espouse a particular evaluative standpoint on important issues are done with the same cool dispassionateness. The first point of view (a) is acceptable, and can indeed be acceptable from the standpoint of its own proponents, only when the teacher sees it as his unconditional duty – in every single case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his lecture less stimulating – to make absolutely clear to his audience, and especially to himself, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced or empirically observed facts and which are statements of practical evaluation. Once one has granted the disjunction between the two spheres, it seems to me that doing this is an imperative requirement of intellectual honesty. It is the absolutely minimal requirement in this case. On the other hand, the question whether one should in general assert practical evaluations in teaching – even with this reservation – is one of practical university policy. On that account, in the last analysis, it must be decided only with reference to those tasks which the individual, according to his own set of values, assigns to the universities. Those who on the basis of their qualifications as university teachers assign to the universities, and thereby to themselves, the universal role of forming character, of inculcating political, ethical, aesthetic, cultural or other beliefs, will take a different position from those who believe it necessary to affirm the proposition and its implications – that university teaching achieves really valuable effects only through specialised training by specially qualified persons. Hence, â€Å"intellectual integrity† is the only specific virtue which universities should seek to inculcate. The first point of view can be defended from as many different ultimate evaluative standpoints as the second. The second – which I personally accept – can be derived from a most enthusiastic as well as from a thoroughly modest estimate of the significance of â€Å"specialised training†. In order to defend this view, one need not be of the opinion that everyone should become as much a pure â€Å"specialist† as possible. One may, on the contrary, espouse it because one does not wish to see the ultimate and deepest personal decisions which a person must make regarding his life, treated exactly as if they were the same as specialised training. One may take this position, however highly one assesses the significance of specialised training, not only for general intellectual training but indirectly also for the self-discipline and the ethical attitude of the young person. Another reason for taking this position is that one does not wish to see the student so influenced by the teacher’s suggestions that he is prevented from solving his problems in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. Professor von Schmoller’s favourable disposition towards the teacher’s assertion of his own evaluations in the lecture room is thoroughly intelligible to me personally as the echo of a great epoch which he and his friends helped to create. Even he, however, cannot deny the fact that for the younger generation the objective situation has changed considerably in one important respect. Forty years ago there existed among the scholars working in our discipline, the widespread belief that of the various possible points of view in the domain of practical-political evaluations, ultimately only one was the ethically correct one. (Schmoller himself took this position only to a limited extent. ) Today this is no longer the case among the proponents of the assertion of professorial evaluations – as may readily be observed. The legitimacy of the assertion of professorial evaluation is no longer defended in the name of an ethical imperative resting on a relatively simple postulate of justice, which both in its ultimate foundations as well as in its consequences, partly was, and partly seemed to be, relatively unambiguous, and above all relatively impersonal, in consequence of its specifically trans-personal character. Rather, as the result of an inevitable development, it is now done in the name of a motley of â€Å"cultural evaluations†, i. e. , actually subjective cultural demands, or quite openly, in the name of the teachers’ alleged â€Å"rights of personality†. One may well wax indignant over this point of view, but one cannot- because it is a â€Å"practical evaluation† – refute it. Of all the types of prophecy, this â€Å"personally† tinted type of professorial prophecy is the most repugnant. There is no precedent for a situation in which a large number of officially appointed prophets do their preaching or make their professions of faith, not, as other prophets do, on the streets, or in churches or other public places- or if they do it privately, then in personally chosen sectarian conventicles – but rather regard themselves as best qualified to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate questions â€Å"in the name of science† and in the carefully protected quiet of governmentally privileged lecture halls in which they cannot be controlled, or checked by discussion, or subjected to contradiction. It is an axiom of long standing, which Schmoller on one occasion vigorously espoused, that what takes place in the lecture hall should be entirely confidential and not subject to public discussion. Although it is possible to contend that, even for purely academic purposes, this may occasionally have certain disadvantages, I take the view that a â€Å"lecture† should be different from a â€Å"speech†. The unconfined rigour, matter-of-factness and sobriety of the lecture declines, with definite pedagogical losses, once it becomes the object of publicity through, for example, the press. It is only in the sphere of his specialised qualifications that the university teacher is entitled to this privilege of freedom from outside surveillance or publicity. There is, however, no specialised qualification for personal prophecy, and for this reason it should not be granted the privilege of freedom from contradiction and public scrutiny. Furthermore, there should be no exploitation of the fact that the student, in order to make his way in life, must attend certain educational institutions and take courses with certain teachers with the result that in addition to what he needs, i.e. , the stimulation and cultivation of his capacity for understanding and reasoning, and a certain body of factual information – he also gets, slipped in among these, the teacher’s own attitude towards the world which even though sometimes interesting is often of no consequence, and which is in any case not open to contradiction and challenge. Like everyone else, the professor has other opportunities for the propagation of his ideals. When these opportunities are lacking, he can easily create them in an appropriate form, as experience has shown in the case of every honorable attempt. But the professor should not demand the right as a professor to carry the marshal’s baton of the statesman or the cultural reformer in his knapsack. This, however, is just what he does when he uses the unassailability of the academic lecture platform for the expression of political – or cultural-political- sentiments. In the press, in public meetings, in associations, in essays, in every avenue which is open to every other citizen, he can and should do what his God or daemon demands. The student should obtain, from his teacher in the lecture hall, the capacity to content himself with the sober execution of a given task; to recognize facts, even those which may be personally uncomfortable, and to distinguish them from his own evaluations. He should also learn to subordinate himself to his task and to repress the impulse to exhibit his personal sensations or other emotional states unnecessarily. This is vastly more important today than it was 40 years ago when the problem did not even exist in its present form. It is not true – as many have insisted – that the â€Å"personality† is and should be a â€Å"whole†, in the sense that it is distorted when it is not exhibited on every possible occasion. Every professional task has its own â€Å"responsibilities† and should be fulfilled accordingly. In the execution of his professional responsibility, a man should confine himself to it alone and should exclude whatever does not strictly belong to it – particularly his own loves and hates. The powerful personality does not manifest itself by trying to give everything a â€Å"personal touch† on every possible occasion. The generation which is now coming of age should, above all, again become used to the thought that â€Å"being a personality† is a condition which cannot be intentionally brought about by wanting it and that there is only one way by which it can – perhaps- be achieved: namely, the unreserved devotion to a â€Å"task†, whatever it – and its derivative â€Å"demands of the hour†- may be in any individual instance. It is in poor taste to mix personal concerns with the specialised analysis of facts. We deprive the word â€Å"vocation† of the only significant meaning it still possesses if we fail to adhere to that specific kind of self-restraint which it requires. But whether the fashionable â€Å"cult of the personality† seeks to dominate the throne, public office or the professorial chair – its effectiveness is only superficially impressive. Intrinsically, it is very petty and it always has injurious consequences. It should not be necessary for me to emphasise that the proponents of the views against which the present essay is directed can accomplish very little by this sort of cult of the â€Å"personality† for the very reason that it is â€Å"personal†. In part, they see the responsibilities of the university teacher in another light, in part they have other educational ideas which I respect but do not share. For this reason we must seriously consider no only what they are striving to achieve, but also how the views which they legitimate by their authority influence a generation with an already extremely pronounced predisposition to overestimate its own importance. Finally, it scarcely needs to be pointed out that many ostensible opponents of the academic assertion of political evaluations are by no means justified when they invoke the postulate of â€Å"ethical neutrality†, which they often gravely misunderstand, to discredit cultural and social-political discussions which take place in public and away from the university lecture hall. The indubitable existence of this spuriously â€Å"ethically neutral† tendentiousness, which in our discipline is manifested in the obstinate and deliberate partisanship of powerful interest groups, explains why a significant number of intellectually honorable scholars still continue to assert personal preferences in their teaching. They are too proud to identify themselves with this spurious abstention from evaluation. I believe that, in spite of this, what in my opinion is right should be done, and that the influence of the practical evaluations of a scholar, who confines himself to championing them on appropriate occasions outside the classroom, will increase when it becomes known that, inside the classroom, he has the strength of character to do exactly what he was appointed to do. But these statements are, in their turn, all matters of evaluation, and hence scientifically undemonstrable. In any case, the fundamental principle which justifies the practice of asserting practical evaluations in teaching can be consistently held only when its proponents demand that the proponents of the evaluations of all other parties be granted the opportunity to demonstrate the validity of their evaluations from the academic platform . But in Germany, insistence on the right of professors to state their preferences has been associated with the very opposite of the demand for the equal representation of all tendencies- including the most â€Å"extreme†. Schmoller thought that he was being entirely consistent when he declared that â€Å"Marxists and the Manchester school† were disqualified from holding academic positions, although he was never so unjust as to ignore their intellectual accomplishments. It is exactly on these points that I could never agree with our honoured master. One obviously ought not in one breath to justify the expression of evaluations in teaching – and when the conclusions are drawn therefrom, point out that the university is a state institution for the training of â€Å"loyal† civil servants. Such a procedure makes the university, not into a specialised technical school- which appears to be so degrading to many teachers- but rather into a theological seminary, although it does not have the religious dignity of the latter. Attempts have been made to set certain purely â€Å"logical† limits to the range of evaluations which should be allowed in university teaching. One of our foremost professors of law once explained, in discussing his opposition to the exclusion of socialists from university posts, that he too would be unwilling to accept an â€Å"anarchist† as a teacher of law since anarchists, in principle, deny the validity of law – and he regarded this argument as conclusive. My own opinion is exactly the opposite. An anarchist can surely be a good legal scholar. And if he is such, then indeed the Archimedean point of his convictions, which is outside the conventions and presuppositions which are so self-evident to us, could enable him to perceive problems in the fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who take them for granted. The most fundamental doubt is one source of knowledge. The jurist is no more responsible for â€Å"proving† the value of these cultural objects which are bound up with â€Å"law†, than the physician is responsible for demonstrating that the prolongation of life should be striven for under all conditions. Neither of them can do this with the means at their disposal. If, however, one wishes to turn the university into a forum for discussion of practical evaluations, then it obviously is obligatory to permit the most unrestricted freedom of discussion of fundamental questions from all standpoints. Is this feasible? Today the most decisive and important political evaluations are denied expression in German universities by the very nature of the present political situation. For all those to whom the interests of the national society transcend any of its individual concrete institutions, it is a question of central importance whether the conception which prevails today regarding the position of the monarch in Germany is reconcilable with the world interests of the country, and with the means- war and diplomacy- through which these are pursued. It is not always the worst patriots nor even anti-monarchists who give a negative answer to this question, and who doubt the possibility of lasting success in both these spheres unless some profound changes are made. Everyone knows, however, that these vital questions of our national life cannot be discussed with full freedom in German universities . In view of the fact that certain evaluations which are of decisive political significance are permanently prohibited in university discussion, it seems to me to be only in accord with the dignity of a representative of science and scholarship to be silent about such evaluations as he is allowed to expound. In no case, however, should the unresolvable question – unresolvable because it is ultimately a question of evaluations – as to whether one may, must, or should champion certain practical evaluations in teaching, be confused with the purely logical discussion of the relationship of evaluations to empirical disciplines such as sociology and economics. Any confusion on this point will hamper the thoroughness of the discussion of the logical problem. However, even the solution of the logical problem will provide no aid in seeking to answer the other question, beyond the two purely logically required conditions of clarity and an explicit distinction by the teacher of the different classes of problems. Nor need I discuss further whether the distinction between empirical propositions or statements of fact and practical evaluations is â€Å"difficult† to make. It is. All of us, those of us who take this position as well as others, come up against it time and again. But the exponents of the so-called â€Å"ethical economics†, particularly, should be aware, even though the moral law is unfulfillable, it is nonetheless â€Å"imposed† as a duty. Self-scrutiny would perhaps show that the fulfillment of this postulate is especially difficult, just because we reluctantly refuse to approach the very alluring subject of evaluation with a titillating â€Å"personal touch†. Every teacher has observed that the faces of his students light up and they become more interested when he begins to make a profession of faith, and that the attendance at his lectures is greatly increased by the expectation that he will do so. Everyone knows furthermore that, in the competition for students, universities when making recommendations for promotion will often give a prophet, however minor, who can fill the lecture halls, the upper hand over a much weightier and more sober scholar who does not offer his own evaluations. Of course, it is  understood that the prohet will leave untouched the politically dominant or conventional evaluations which are generally accepted at the time. Only the spuriously â€Å"ethical-neutral† prophet who speaks for powerful groups has, of course, better opportunities for promotion as a result of the influence which these groups have on the prevailing political powers. I regard all this as very unsatisfactory, and I will therefore not go into the proposition that the demand for abstention from evaluation is â€Å"petty† and that it makes lectures â€Å"boring†. I will not go into the question as to whether lecturers on specialised empirical problems must seek above all to be â€Å"interesting†. For my own part, in any case, I fear that a lecturer who makes his lectures stimulating by the intrusion of personal evaluations will, in the long run, weaken the students’ taste for sober empirical analysis. I will acknowledge without further discussion that it is possible, under the guise of eliminating all practical evaluations, to insinuate such evaluations with especial force by simple â€Å"letting the facts speak for themselves†. The better kind of parliamentary and electoral speeches in Germany operate in this way – and quite legitimately, given their purposes. No words should be wasted in declaring that all such procedures in university lectures, particularly if one is concerned with the observance of this separation, are , of all abuses, the most abhorrent. The fact, however, that a dishonestly created illusion of the fulfillment of an ethical imperative can be passed off as the reality, constitutes no criticism of the imperative itself. At any rate, even if the teacher does not believe that he should deny himself the right of rendering evaluations, he should make it absolutely explicit to the students and to himself that he is doing so. Finally, we must oppose to the utmost the widespread view that scientific â€Å"objectivity† is achieved by weighing the various evaluations against one another and making a â€Å"statesman-like† compromise among them. The â€Å"middle way† is not only just as undemonstrable scientifically – with the means of the empirical sciences – as the â€Å"most extreme† evaluations: in the sphere of evaluations, it is the least unequivocal. It does not belong in the university – but rather in political programmes, government offices, and in parliament. IThe sciences, both normative and empirical, are capable of rendering an inestimable service to persons engaged in political activity by telling them that (1) these and these â€Å"ultimate† evaluative positions are conceivable with reference to this practical problem; and (2) that such and such are the facts which you must take into account in making your choice between these evaluative positions. And with this we come to the real problem.

How to Write Psychology Research Paper Thesis

How to Write Psychology Research Paper Thesis First of all, psychology research paper thesis should be organized like any other scientific thesis. The sections are: title, abstract, introduction, results, discussion, references and endnotes. The title of your paper should tell to reader a lot about the content of your work, and it should be as short as possible. Abstract is a brief summary of the entire work, usually it consists of one paragraph. Here you mention problem and method of solving it, results and your conclusions. The abstract should give the reader clear idea about your work. After reading your abstract, the reader will decide if your paper deserves his attention. Introduction should introduce the reader to the problem and include questions you try to answer. It underlines theoretical or practical importance of the work. There are two ways to construct the introduction. In the first case you can state the problem and then mention what is written about it. The second variant is to review the history of the problem and then state the problem itself. The introduction must lead to the statement of your chosen approach. Results. Here you bring the summary of your work, explaining what you have actually found. It should not contain detailed statistics but some useful data to help readers understand the situation. All kinds of graphs, tables and charts are very effective in this section of the paper. Then you come to discussion. You can bring the summary of results and return to the basic question of the work, comparing the results with your hypothesis. References also must be organized in appropriate way, listing all the works used for your research. Following these easy steps you will surely write successful psychology research paper thesis.